India’s Move from Sales Tax to VAT: A Hit or Miss? by Santra, Sattwik & Hati, Koushik Kumar
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
India’s Move from Sales Tax to VAT: A
Hit or Miss?
Sattwik Santra and Koushik Kumar Hati
Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta
1 January 2014
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/54542/
MPRA Paper No. 54542, posted 19 March 2014 07:20 UTC
India’s Move from Sales Tax to VAT: A Hit or Miss? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sattwik Santra   
Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta 
 
 
Koushik Kumar Hati 
Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Government of India introduced Value Added Tax (VAT) across all its states in subsequent stages in 
the early years of this millennium. The main motive behind this move was to make the commercial tax 
collection more transparent, accountable and revenue enhancing. The purpose of this paper is to 
analyze if the introduction of VAT has indeed served its purpose or not. We find that in terms of the 
effective change in the rate of taxation and in terms of a change in the overall tax base, the number of 
states affected adversely by the new VAT regime is greater than the number of states that have been 
affected positively. Also the sum of the average tax collected, as well as the sum of the average state 
domestic product of the negatively affected states far outweighs those of the states affected favorably.  
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I. Introduction 
Tax earning is one of the most important sources of revenue for any government. In India, 
indirect tax (i.e., tax on goods and services) contributes almost a quarter of the total revenue 
collected across the nation1 and forms one of the chief sources of revenues for the state 
governments. During the last decade, the state governments of India2 reached an agreement 
whereby the states decided to switch from the existing Sales Tax (ST) system to a new Value 
Added Tax (VAT) model of taxation of goods. According to a whitepaper published by the 
Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers:  
“The State-level VAT … has certain distinct advantages over the existing sales tax 
structure. The VAT will not only provide full set-off for input tax as well as tax on previous 
purchases, but it will also abolish the burden of several of the existing taxes … As a result, 
the overall tax burden will be rationalised, and prices, in general, will fall. Moreover, 
VAT will replace the existing system of inspection by a system of built-in self-assessment 
by traders and manufacturers. The tax structure will become simple and more 
transparent. This will significantly improve tax compliance and will also help increase 
revenue growth.” 3  
It’s been almost a decade since a majority of the states have opted for VAT and this exercise 
addresses whether the introduction of VAT has indeed significantly diminished the overall tax 
burden and has improved the tax base of the states. 
Before the introduction of VAT, indirect taxes on eligible goods were charged on an ad valorem 
basis whenever these items are transacted between a seller and a purchaser (which can be firms, 
intermediate sellers and consumers). In this form of sales tax, complete exemption is not given 
in respect to the inputs used in production of goods and this leads to cascading. In addition, the 
cost of holding inventories goes up which leads to higher interest payments and additional 
cascading. Because of these features of indirect sales tax, the system has been criticized on a 
number of grounds. It is argued that, this system of taxation creates an artificial incentive for 
vertical integration and leads to misallocation of resources, dampening the economic growth – 
ultimately having a negative impact on the tax base thereby hindering the process of revenue 
generation and resource mobilization of the Government. According to Cnossen (2012): 
1 According to the World Databank in India the contribution of Goods and Service Tax in Total Revenue collection 
is 24.12 per cent for the year 2011; Website: www.data.worldbank.org; Site accessed on 12th July 2013.  
2 Through the rest of this paper, the term ‘States’ is deemed to include ‘Union Territories.’ 
3 Whitepaper by The Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers (2005). 
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 “India’s system of indirect taxation at the central and state level is a serious obstacle to 
the formation of a single common market in which businesses source anywhere, 
manufacture anywhere and sell anywhere. Its complexity is baffling and its incidence 
highly capricious and indeterminate. The system’s multiple tax-on-tax effects cascade 
throughout the production-distribution chain with harmful economic consequences. 
These effects are compounded by the lack of coordination between various forms of 
indirect taxation (sales taxes, excise duties, import duties) and between different levels of 
government (Centre vs. States, and States vs. other States), as well as by the uneven 
enforcement of the respective tax administrations.”  
To address these major problems of the prevailing taxation-system, VAT was introduced in the 
country in the early years of twenty-first century. VAT in theory, avoids the cascade effect of 
sales tax by taxing only the value added at each stage of production. It was thought that VAT 
would address the problems of the existing system of taxes (Purohit M. C., 1993) and its 
introduction was seen as an important breakthrough in the sphere of indirect tax reforms in 
India. The decision to implement state level VAT was reached in the meeting of the 
Empowered Committee (EC) of State Finance Ministers, held on June 18, 2004, where a 
consensus was arrived at to introduce VAT in all States. In spite of this, there were many 
controversies at the time of introducing VAT across the states. A major number of states were 
not convinced about the prospects of this new tax system and there was skepticism at different 
levels of the polity, society and economy. For instance, small entrepreneurs and businessmen 
were predicting a high compliance costs and harassment by the tax authorities, whereas the 
consumers were worried about the effect of VAT on prices of goods which are of their daily 
requirement. From the side of the business community concerns were raised, about the 
problems of obtaining refund on excess input tax, about the large number of goods which would 
be subject to VAT but were exempted from sales tax and about the higher tax rates on a number 
of goods under this new system of taxation. Add to that, the record keeping requirements under 
VAT would result in a waste of valuable time and an increase in the cost of doing business. 
More over VAT would pave the way for harassment of traders by the tax authorities4. To do 
away with these misconceptions a well-organized publicity campaign aimed at educating the 
stakeholders of the VAT system5, such as the business sector and the general public has been 
4 Effectiveness of Publicity Campaign on Value Added Tax in India (Sthanumoorthy, 2008) 
5 Whitepaper by the Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers (2005). 
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initiated from the year 2005 and eventually at present, all the states and union territories have 
a VAT system in place.  
 
II. Review of Related Literatures 
Value Added Tax as an indirect tax collection mechanism has been adopted by more than 130 
countries in the world. Many studies focused on impact of this switchover from Sales Tax to 
Value Added Tax method of collecting tax from the commercial sector of an economy. Ruggeri 
and Bluck (1990) have worked on the incidence of Manufacturers’ Sales Tax (MST) and the 
Goods and Service Tax (GST) in France. They have found that VAT and GST are more 
regressive than the MST. Report by the European Commission (2004), points that losses from 
fraud have amounted to 10 percent of net VAT receipts in some member states. Most famously, 
the cost of carousel fraud in particular (a class of schemes exploiting the zero-rating of exports 
and deferral of tax on intra – EU imports) has been put at around €2.1 billion in Germany 
(roughly 1.5 percent of VAT revenue) and at £1.12–1.9 billion in the United Kingdom (about 
1.5–2.5 percent of VAT revenue). Smart and Bird (2009) analyzed the economic impact of 
replacing the retail sales tax with VAT in Canada. The paper estimates the effects of this tax 
substitution on consumer prices in the provinces of the country where VAT was introduced. 
They found that the resulting effective tax rate changes were shifted forward to consumers in 
most of the sectors. However, the overall effect on tax inclusive consumer prices was small, 
regressive rather.  
For the Indian scenario, various economists have worked on the emergence of Sales Tax and 
Value Added Tax in India. Notable among them are by  Ayyar (1976),  Purohit (1982) and  
(1986). The discussion on the adoption of Value Added Tax and its problems and prospects 
was first introduced by  Purohit (1993). In this paper the author examines the general trends in 
the structure of VAT rates, tax base and exemptions in the countries which have adopted it. 
The author then presents his assessment of the existing system of commodity taxation in India 
and against that background, discusses the likely problems in introducing VAT in the context 
of the country's federal structure. In recent years, studies have also discussed about the wrong 
implementation procedure of VAT (Mukhopadhyay, 2002) and also if VAT is going to deliver 
more revenue for the government (Das-Gupta, 2005). Mukhopadhyay (2002) discusses the 
problem of inducing a tax like VAT in a fredaration as it involves a compromise between the 
interests of different states. Das-gupta (2005) in his descriptive paper focuses on the possible 
weaknesses of VAT which have escaped attention. The problem of large informal sector, 
invoice fraud, administrative hazard, etc. has been highlighed in this paper. These studies on 
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India, are purely based on theoretical and/or subjective perspective and we have not come 
across any empirical studies comparing these two different modes of taxation. The present 
paper aims to fulfill this gap in the existing literature and offer some empirical conclusions to 
some of the concerns presented in the literature. 
 
III. Data 
Our study compares the amounts of tax revenue collected by the state governments against the 
total value of outputs of goods produced in the states. For commercial tax collection (for both 
VAT and Sales Tax) we compiled data from the annual report - State Finance: A study of 
Budgets published by Reserve Bank of India. For the value of output, we use the component 
wise Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) of the different states of India as provided by the 
Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India. The data have 
been tabulated considering 2004 as our base year. Our data consist of 28 state level observations 
spanning a period from 1993 to 2011. Of the 28 states, 18 states are general category states 
while 10 states belong to special category6.  
 
IV. Descriptive Statistics: Tax Effort in the Pre & Post VAT Regime 
We begin with a preliminary exploration of the data. Summary statistics for the key variables 
are given in Table 1(a and b).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 As per the Planning Commission of India. 
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Table 1a 
Descriptive Statistics 
  State total Sales Tax (in Rupees billion) over states State GSDP (in Rupees billion) over states 
Year Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
1993 22.6859 15.9326 24.8546 1.18936 3.90416 543.838 444.304 546.25 1.39193 4.84044 
1994 24.8023 21.5508 26.9296 1.21752 4.02627 582.577 480.687 577.515 1.25983 4.27759 
1995 26.114 19.8384 28.7778 1.33578 4.48504 612.108 469.989 623.956 1.39297 4.81748 
1996 28.0239 21.7499 29.8108 1.11475 3.64588 658.337 511.237 669.19 1.33389 4.51991 
1997 29.373 22.8897 31.121 1.06403 3.46402 691.54 531.555 695.956 1.33119 4.62293 
1998 29.7163 22.0395 31.4242 1.01425 3.24644 731.865 558.193 730.008 1.24927 4.28603 
1999 30.6895 24.1499 35.1008 1.34489 4.47378 746.947 574.281 782.913 1.37163 4.76634 
2000 32.3853 20.4355 38.7252 1.42331 4.66834 759.232 564.75 787.969 1.2861 4.31746 
2001 31.9133 18.0038 36.912 1.41896 4.58207 792.614 600.272 816.083 1.27046 4.31008 
2002 34.342 19.2574 39.5731 1.45065 4.7607 822.782 596.39 855.306 1.35193 4.6546 
2003 37.3378 20.9074 42.8393 1.43297 4.69335 891.951 686.734 922.735 1.32731 4.60544 
2004 40.2599 20.9857 46.3173 1.46132 4.86328 962.572 777.294 996.691 1.34917 4.70764 
2005 44.6499 23.8801 50.0351 1.28646 3.98375 1049.9 779.079 1114.82 1.43626 5.04195 
2006 50.2632 24.9118 56.8276 1.33838 4.19302 1162.86 900.948 1247.79 1.50521 5.37889 
2007 53.2997 23.9784 60.2668 1.29547 3.99562 1271.22 952.739 1373.46 1.5585 5.63865 
2008 56.2768 29.6753 63.4878 1.33863 4.18431 1354.29 1068.57 1433.95 1.44957 5.16103 
2009 58.7301 32.2407 65.0988 1.29968 4.09228 1462.51 1132.47 1553.99 1.49274 5.35904 
2010 67.9593 32.1261 76.1862 1.34765 4.28986 1604.54 1245.37 1709.72 1.50672 5.42077 
2011 77.5223 38.005 86.3001 1.29141 3.89379 1723.3 1306.69 1832.6 1.49854 5.39463 
Total 41.5806 23.5056 51.283 2.00295 7.94715 973.402 603.716 1127.77 2.17253 9.79483 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data. 
 
  
6 
 
Table 1b 
Descriptive Statistics 
 State total Sales Tax (in Rupees billion) over time State GSDP (in Rupees billion) over time 
State Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
 General Category States 
Andhra Pradesh 109.652 94.6358 52.1454 0.6389 2.328 2233.67 1900.13 901.191 0.6612 2.141 
Bihar 23.3447 23.2636 5.0692 1.0661 4.7585 778.569 693.396 285.846 0.9284 2.889 
Chhattisgarh 20.9454 21.6577 9.0169 0.0202 2.3201 481.214 389.538 174.579 0.8038 2.2627 
Delhi 50.2658 46.2369 23.2654 0.1834 2.0061 1014.45 849.697 483.004 0.7611 2.3751 
Goa 6.0361 5.6719 1.9938 0.6719 3.0955 123.485 107.331 51.127 0.6735 2.4205 
Gujarat 94.2333 74.2316 41.2273 1.0161 2.8257 2045.66 1627.47 928.934 0.7614 2.3193 
Haryana 41.4127 37.0079 20.7823 0.3609 1.8268 933.134 804.244 416.324 0.6865 2.2262 
Jharkhand 24.9974 21.7491 6.724 0.7095 2.1149 562.417 500.123 173.833 0.9183 2.892 
Karnataka 83.3298 67.8579 31.239 0.6979 2.2858 1665.86 1467.17 630.786 0.5455 2.0301 
Kerala 67.0705 62.7634 25.8772 0.9501 3.0456 1160.46 1020.71 452.371 0.6725 2.2259 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
39.9147 33.3669 15.9311 1.0346 3.1614 1154.82 1026.34 371.967 0.8993 2.8378 
Maharashtra 178.093 159.388 69.4656 0.6933 2.4429 4262.2 3538.85 1770.34 0.7273 2.2087 
Orissa 24.3743 19.2574 11.6275 0.774 2.3724 755.604 600.272 286.939 0.688 2.0157 
Punjab 35.5909 32.4944 15.896 0.8546 2.8313 968.07 869.875 299.524 0.633 2.1704 
Rajasthan 45.2131 39.2732 20.2892 0.4427 1.8634 1280.01 1122.68 468.919 0.7177 2.5345 
Tamil Nadu 126.021 112.416 47.4985 0.8319 2.9928 2294.43 1854.01 949.896 0.835 2.4787 
Uttar Pradesh 93.1412 80.9597 43.7688 0.8431 2.7322 2614.04 2350.86 771.246 0.7137 2.3458 
Uttarakhand 11.3672 10.7513 6.1511 0.3196 2.2155 269.612 203.827 150.476 0.9866 2.5682 
West Bengal 54.9394 45.861 18.6764 0.9986 2.9181 1981.25 1838.16 688.663 0.434 2.0291 
 Special Category States 
Arunachal 
Pradesh 
0.3593 0.2297 0.3709 0.5687 1.8511 32.1821 28.2032 12.2109 0.6678 2.1223 
Assam 17.3009 16.1165 8.1633 0.4918 1.9605 521.867 485.512 127.524 0.8361 2.569 
Himachal 
Pradesh 
6.2773 4.1994 4.4496 1.1363 3.2413 233.272 207.094 92.6891 0.5959 2.1739 
Jammu and 
Kashmir 
8.0428 5.7049 5.8342 0.7769 2.4028 263.822 246.718 73.5176 0.4743 2.0573 
Manipur 0.6893 0.5199 0.5235 1.0734 3.0536 47.9628 42.415 14.0699 0.4745 2.0485 
Meghalaya 1.343 1.0496 0.8165 0.6926 2.1824 63.0619 57.3366 24.1425 0.5611 2.1711 
Mizoram 0.424 0.4017 0.2921 0.3466 2.0088 31.5165 28.6942 9.7052 0.6635 2.1713 
Nagaland 0.6201 0.4898 0.3814 1.0073 2.9936 55.5588 53.1582 21.1267 0.416 1.8424 
Sikkim 0.4445 0.4818 0.2724 0.2278 1.7625 19.8068 14.9634 13.2954 1.4667 3.7839 
Tripura 1.6816 1.4664 1.2244 0.9734 3.0941 83.2177 77.7612 36.3785 0.5399 2.1885 
Total 41.5806 23.5056 51.283 2.003 7.9471 973.402 603.716 1127.77 2.1725 9.7948 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data. 
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 In order to comment on the dynamics of the States’ indirect commodity tax collection, we first 
consider how, the amount of the total indirect commodity tax collected by the different states 
as a proportion of their gross domestic products (this gross state domestic product is hereafter 
referred to as GSDP), have changed across the two tax regimes. This ratio which serves as a 
crude indicator to measure the tax effort of the respective states, provide us an overview of the 
impact of the introduction of VAT on the amount of tax collection. Here, it is to be noted that, 
the Indian states have started introducing VAT as a commercial tax collection mechanism from 
the year 2003. Haryana was the first state to introduce VAT in 2003 and Uttar Pradesh was the 
last to do the same in 2008 (refer to Figure: 1). 
 
Figure: 1 
Introduction of Value Added Tax in Several States of India 
 
 
 
However, majority of the states have gone for implementing VAT in 2005. A visual inspection 
of the average tax – GSDP ratios of the states in the pre and post VAT regime (refer to Table 
2), suggests that the introduction of VAT has indeed resulted in an increase in the average tax 
– GSDP ratio for all but seven general category states of the country. Among the general 
category states, this average ratio has decreased for Bihar, Goa, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, 
Maharashtra and West Bengal whereas it has increased for the remaining states of Andhra 
Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Haryana, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan 
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Tamil Nadu, Uttarakhand, and Uttar Pradesh.  The states which have gained the maximum after 
introducing VAT in terms of a quantitative increase in the tax – GSDP ratio are, Uttar Pradesh 
followed by Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand, while Bihar and Goa are worst affected states (refer 
to table 2). None of the special category states have been negatively affected and all these states 
have registered a hike in the average tax – GSDP ratio after having VAT introduced. Again, in 
terms of the amount of an increase in the tax – GSDP ratio, Jammu & Kashmir have benefitted 
the maximum followed by Assam, Himachal Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram. The 
north – eastern states of Nagaland and Sikkim have gained relatively marginally.  
Table 2 
Changes in tax-GSDP Ratios 
States 
Average tax-
GSDP Ratio 
in ST 
Regime 
Standard 
Deviation of 
tax-GSDP 
Ratio in ST 
Regime 
Average tax-
GSDP Ratio 
in VAT 
Regime 
Standard 
Deviation of 
tax-GSDP Ratio 
in VAT Regime 
Change in 
Average 
tax-GSDP 
Ratio  
General Category States 
Andhra Pradesh 0.0456 0.0049 0.0513 0.0019 0.0057 
Bihar 0.0392 0.0107 0.0225 0.0020 -0.0167 
Chhattisgarh 0.0312 0.0089 0.0398 0.0027 0.0086 
Delhi 0.0490 0.0104 0.0498 0.0045 0.0008 
Goa 0.0536 0.0051 0.0458 0.0048 -0.0078 
Gujarat 0.0474 0.0044 0.0455 0.0018 -0.0018 
Haryana 0.0393 0.0044 0.0472 0.0044 0.0079 
Jharkhand 0.0375 0.0056 0.0382 0.0036 0.0007 
Karnataka 0.0505 0.0032 0.0499 0.0023 -0.0006 
Kerala 0.0594 0.0023 0.0560 0.0034 -0.0033 
Madhya Pradesh 0.0326 0.0023 0.0368 0.0022 0.0041 
Maharashtra 0.0433 0.0027 0.0403 0.0013 -0.0029 
Orissa 0.0293 0.0027 0.0347 0.0024 0.0055 
Punjab 0.0328 0.0040 0.0402 0.0041 0.0074 
Rajasthan 0.0325 0.0043 0.0381 0.0014 0.0056 
Tamil Nadu 0.0210 0.0084 0.0253 0.0086 0.0043 
Uttarakhand 0.0270 0.0095 0.0351 0.0022 0.0081 
Uttar Pradesh 0.0320 0.0046 0.0417 0.0033 0.0097 
West Bengal 0.0286 0.0038 0.0274 0.0015 -0.0011 
Special Category States 
Arunachal Pradesh 0.0040 0.0053 0.0166 0.0022 0.0126 
Assam 0.0266 0.0056 0.0401 0.0028 0.0135 
Himachal Pradesh 0.0194 0.0016 0.0327 0.0049 0.0132 
Jammu and Kashmir 0.0184 0.0056 0.0421 0.0055 0.0237 
Manipur 0.0091 0.0030 0.0193 0.0046 0.0101 
Meghalaya 0.0164 0.0023 0.0252 0.0015 0.0089 
Mizoram 0.0043 0.0034 0.0166 0.0016 0.0123 
Nagaland 0.0088 0.0009 0.0130 0.0018 0.0042 
Sikkim 0.0210 0.0084 0.0253 0.0086 0.0043 
Tripura 0.0144 0.0031 0.0239 0.0032 0.0095 
Note: ST – Sales Tax; VAT-Value Added Tax; Change in Average tax-GSDP Ratio is calculated by subtracting 
the Average tax-GSDP Ratio in ST Regime from Average tax-GSDP Ratio in VAT regime. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data. 
 
Although the tax – GSDP ratio helps us to shed some light about the changes in the tax 
collections between regimes, more formal statistical modelling is necessary to truly discern the 
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sources and the implications of the changes in the trends associated with the introduction of 
VAT. Based on the objective of the paper we are interested in the impact of the switchover 
from ST to VAT on the untaxable volume of GSDP and the effective rate of taxation for which, 
an analysis that is based solely on the tax – GSDP ratio of the two tax regime, is not sufficient 
to fulfil the objective.  
In what follows we therefore build up a model using which, we can compare between the 
relative efficacies of the two tax mechanisms in terms of the aforementioned factors.  
 
V. An empirical model 
The total indirect tax collection is a sum of individual tax collected from various economic 
entities (which may be firms, sellers intermediate or otherwise) of an economy. These 
individual taxes are in turn, some predetermined fractions of the output of the respective 
sectors. Ideally:  
𝑇𝑇 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗                                                                                                                        
where T is the total indirect tax collection, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 is either the value of output (in case of sales tax) 
or the value added (in case of VAT) of the jth economic entity and 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 is the rate at which the jth 
entity is taxed (which may be zero). But we cannot possibly have data on these economic 
entities at such a disaggregated level. So instead, we suggest an alternative methodology where 
we utilize the aggregated value of output and rewrite the above identity as: 
𝑇𝑇 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 − 𝑈𝑈                    … (1) 
In the above relation, T retains its previous definition as the total indirect tax collection, Y is 
the value of the aggregate output of the economy, 𝛽𝛽 is the effective tax rate and U is the 
potential untaxed amount that the government foregoes since a portion of the aggregate output 
is not taxed – either by law or because of tax evasion. For our purpose, we inspect two aspects 
of the above relationship; that across the tax regimes, if there has been a significant change in 
the effective rate of taxation (i.e., 𝛽𝛽) and if there has been any significant change in the overall 
tax base captured by the change in the mean level of the potential untaxed component (i.e., U). 
Thus keeping in accord with the above relation, we suggest the following empirical model:  
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡 < 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆              … (2) 
which can be written more compactly as: 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + Δ𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(1 − 𝐼𝐼)𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖             … (3) 
where 𝐼𝐼 = 0 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡 < 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆, Δ𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ≡ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 
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and subscript ‘i’ represents the states and ‘t’ the time period associated with the respective 
observation or coefficients. Special attention needs to be paid to the terms:  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖. The 
term 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 not only constitutes the state specific random shock (that represents, for example, the 
errors in observations) but is also comprised of the demeaned potential untaxed part of the state 
(recall the term U of equation (1)) whereas 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 captures the mean component of the same.  
Equation (3) constitutes our baseline model. Our interest is to test for the significance of 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 − 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 which reflects the change in the effective tax rate for the ‘ith’ state as also the 
significance of Δ𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, which captures the change in the overall tax base of the state as a result of 
a change in the tax regime. For the state, a significant negative 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 − 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 indicates an overall 
decrease in the effective rate of taxation with the introduction of VAT whereas a significant 
positive Δ𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 represents an increase in the overall tax base of the state in the post – VAT regime 
achieved by a decrease in the potential untaxed part of the state (as the expected sign of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 
and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 is negative). In what follows, we estimate equation (3) using our panel level data on 
the Indian states. 
 
VI. Estimation and results 
As discussed above, our data consist of the amounts of states’ total sales tax revenues on 
commodities and is composed of the components: state sales tax/VAT, central sales tax, sales 
tax on motor spirit and lubricants, surcharge on sales tax, turnover tax and other receipts. We 
also have data on state level annual GSDP (in real terms with 2004 as the base period) split 
into various sectors7 spanning a time period of 19 years starting from the year 1993. All of our 
data on taxes have been adjusted with respect to changes in price considering the year 2004 as 
our base period. Since indirect taxes collected by the states are not levied from all the sectors 
(which constitutes the GSDP) we consider the sum of outputs of only those sectors which are 
subject to such taxation (which consists of the sectors – agriculture, combined forestry and 
logging, fishing, mining and quarrying, registered manufacturing, construction, combined 
trade, hotels and restaurants, combined electricity, gas and water supply and finally transport 
by other means) and have thus omitted the service sectors from the GSDP (the constituents of 
which are: transport by railways, storage and communication, combined banking and 
7 These sectors are: agriculture, combined forestry and logging, fishing, combined mining and quarrying, 
registered and unregistered manufacturing, construction, combined electricity, gas and water supply, combined 
transport by railways and other means, storage and communication, combined trade, hotels and restaurants, 
combined banking and insurance, combined real estate, ownership of dwellings and business services, 
combined public administration and defense and lastly other services. 
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insurance, combined real estate, ownership of dwellings and business services, combined 
public administration and defense and other services) as also unregistered manufacturing.  
Our model structure suggests that the error component is inclusive of the demeaned potential 
untaxed part and as such, should be correlated with the value of the aggregate output, i.e., Yit.  
So we use the values of outputs of registered manufacturing, construction and combined 
outputs of trade, hotels and restaurants as instruments while estimating equation (3) using fixed 
effects panel estimation utilizing generalized methods of moments with instrumental variables. 
The rationale behind using the values of outputs of these particular sectors as instruments is 
that, the incidence of taxation is very high on these aforementioned sectors compared to the 
others and the firms belonging to these sectors are relatively more likely to be registered with 
the government (chiefly because of the nature of their output and thus they have an untaxed 
amount which is close to zero). As the errors are very likely to be heteroscedastic as well as 
auto correlated, we use heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors 
(computed using quadratic spectral kernel with a rule of thumb bandwidth of 3 periods based 
on the number of observations and with finite sample correction8) for our significance tests.  
We begin by reporting the results of our estimation which is summarized in Table 3. The table 
also reports the centered and uncentered R – squared for the model goodness of fit and Hansen 
J statistic of over identifying restrictions to check for the validity of all instruments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Andrews and Monahan (1992). 
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Table 3 
Estimation results (Total sales tax collected by the states) 
States 
Coefficient of GSDP under 
ST regime 
(I) 
Coefficient of GSDP 
under VAT regime 
(II) 𝚫𝚫𝜶𝜶𝒊𝒊(in Rs lakhs) 
Coefficient 
(I)=(II) 
(p-values) 
Coefficient 
(I)<=(II) 
(p-values) 
General Category States 
Andhra Pradesh 0.1115*** 0.1098*** -108881.7969 0.9022 0.4511 
 (0.0094) (0.0107) (217301.0000)   
Bihar -0.0326*** 0.0459*** -419777.9063*** 0.0000 1 
 (0.0124) (0.0022) (60976.3100)   
Delhi 0.1873*** 0.1663*** 76452.7891 0.5464 0.2732 
 (0.0204) (0.0404) (199632.3000)   
Goa 0.0564*** 0.0540*** 1531.9580 0.8219 0.411 
 (0.0077) (0.0096) (13576.4400)   
Gujarat 0.0467*** 0.0684*** -297733.3125 0.2275 0.8862 
 (0.0086) (0.0100) (314133.6000)   
Haryana 0.0946*** 0.0519*** 312070.5000** 0.0655 0.0328 
 (0.0165) (0.0084) (142600.5000)   
Jharkhand -0.0696 0.0844*** -610450.6250* 0.0753 0.9624 
 (0.0904) (0.0147) (330916.5000)   
Karnataka 0.0388 0.1412* -1191085.0000 0.3488 0.8256 
 (0.0554) (0.0786) (1356310.0000)   
Kerala 0.0925*** 0.1941*** -902810.5000*** 0.0050 0.9975 
 (0.0134) (0.0286) (313049.1000)   
Madhya Pradesh 0.0693*** 0.0679*** 18896.8594 0.9196 0.4598 
 (0.0057) (0.0101) (116446.1000)   
Maharashtra 0.0992*** 0.1022*** -423634.9063 0.9048 0.5476 
 (0.0163) (0.0111) (626835.7000)   
Orissa 0.1403** 0.0327 532652.3750 0.2182 0.1091 
 (0.0707) (0.0218) (409491.9000)   
Punjab 0.0880*** 0.0991*** -73775.8828 0.7467 0.6266 
 (0.0166) (0.0268) (251045.8000)   
Rajasthan 0.0758*** 0.0408*** 387023.8125*** 0.0000 0 
 (0.0064) (0.0081) (92887.3700)   
Tamil Nadu 0.1142*** 0.1055*** -67669.3984 0.5939 0.2969 
 (0.0080) (0.0157) (297743.5000)   
Uttar Pradesh 0.1023*** 0.1156*** -253078.2969 0.6110 0.6945 
 (0.0045) (0.0271) (594138.3000)   
Uttarakhand 0.1538** 0.0452*** 162492.5938* 0.0982 0.0491 
 (0.0651) (0.0037) (88875.1500)   
West Bengal 0.0330*** 0.0801*** -601127.0000*** 0.0000 1 
 (0.0068) (0.0049) (99105.7900)   
Special Category States 
Arunachal Pradesh -0.2570 0.0519 -74377.7969 0.8309 0.5846 
 (1.4012) (0.0758) (361375.4000)   
Assam 0.1813*** 0.0770*** 394347.0000*** 0.0000 0 
 (0.0197) (0.0161) (81920.9600)   
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Himachal Pradesh 0.0374*** 0.0932*** -96207.3984*** 0.0000 1 
 (0.0028) (0.0099) (21418.7500)   
Jammu and Kashmir 0.0988*** 0.2490*** -246979.2969*** 0.0000 1 
 (0.0119) (0.0233) (53981.4800)   
Manipur 0.0200*** 0.0855*** -21538.3301*** 0.0000 1 
 (0.0023) (0.0043) (1925.5870)   
Meghalaya 0.0405*** 0.0553*** -4110.4941*** 0.0000 1 
 (0.0027) (0.0020) (1406.9600)   
Mizoram 0.1066*** 0.0496*** 8407.7676*** 0.0000 0 
 (0.0062) (0.0031) (735.6998)   
Nagaland 0.0151*** 0.0542*** -12692.9502*** 0.0000 1 
 (0.0020) (0.0060) (2590.8360)   
Sikkim 0.1021*** 0.0044* 10202.4902*** 0.0000 0 
 (0.0159) (0.0024) (946.5291)   
Tripura 0.0472*** 0.0626*** -8234.9004 0.2957 0.8522 
 (0.0040) (0.0126) (9977.4340)   
Hansen J statistic 
(overidentification test of 
all instruments):                  
Chi-square(28)  P-value: 
           
IV Reset Test  
(Ho: E(y|X) linear in X): 
Chi-square(3)  P-value:   
         
 
 
27.8160 
0.4742 
 
 
2.7200 
0.4363 
R2: 0.9705 (uncentered) 
0.9705 (centered) 
  
 
Number of observations:  
 
511 
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The results show that the estimated values of βST and βVAT are significant at 1% level for most 
of the states9. A significance test for the equality of βST and βVAT (reported in column 5 of the 
table) reveals that for most of the general category states that include Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, 
Goa, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Uttar 
Pradesh, and two of the special category states namely, Arunachal Pradesh and Tripura there 
have been no significant change in the effective rate of taxation. On the other hand (as indicated 
by the figures reported in column 6 of the table), following the introduction of VAT, this rate 
has increased for a few general category states like Bihar, Jharkhand, Kerala and West Bengal, 
and a majority of the special category states which include Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and 
Kashmir, Manipur, Meghalaya, and Nagaland. It is only for the general category states of 
Haryana, Rajasthan and Uttarakhand and the special category states of Assam, Mizoram and 
Sikkim that the results indicate a net decrease in the effective rate of taxation with the advent 
of VAT.  
Next we look at the change in the overall tax base of the states as a result of the introduction of 
VAT. As we have mentioned before, this is captured by Δ𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 (reported in column 4 of the table) 
which represents the overall change in the tax base of the respective state in the post – VAT 
regime. The results clearly indicate that just like the case of the effective rate of taxation, the 
general category states of Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Goa, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and the special category states of 
Arunachal Pradesh and Tripura have registered no significant change in the overall tax base. 
Also in accord with the effective rate of taxation, the states of Bihar, Jharkhand, Kerala and 
West Bengal belonging to the general category states and the states of Himachal Pradesh, 
Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, Meghalaya, and Nagaland belonging to the special category 
states have experienced a contraction in their overall tax base while the reverse can be observed 
for the general category states of Haryana, Rajasthan and Uttarakhand and the special category 
states of Assam, Mizoram and Sikkim.  
In addition to these results, our estimation yields a value of R2 (both centered and uncentered) 
which indicates that our baseline model specification adequately explains the tax collection of 
the states. Apart from this, the Hansen J statistic reported in the table indicates that our choice 
of instruments is valid for our purpose and as such, the instruments are uncorrelated with our 
9 Note that a negative estimate of the coefficient associated with the GSDP of Bihar may be attributed to the fact 
that, the data available on sales tax collection for this state, are mostly revised estimates and are not true 
budget accounts. 
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error term10. Also reported is Ramsey's (1969) regression specification-error test (RESET) as 
adapted by Pesaran and Taylor (1999) and Pagan and Hall (1983) for instrumental variables 
(IV) estimation. 
From these results, we are prompted to conclude that, contrary to the views expressed in the 
Whitepaper by The Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers (2005), for a majority 
of the states, there has been no significant positive impact of the introduction of VAT both in 
terms of the effective decrease in the rate of taxation as also in terms of a net increase in the 
overall tax base. Also, not only are the number of states affected adversely by the new VAT 
regime, greater than the number of states that have been affected positively, but the sum of the 
average tax collected, as well as the sum of the average state domestic product of the negatively 
affected states far outweighs those of the states affected favorably.  
 
VII. Robustness 
In order to further validate our claims, we conduct two additional exercises. First, instead of 
considering the states’ total sales tax revenues on commodities as our dependent variable, we 
rerun our exercise after deducting from our dependent variable, the central sales tax (hereafter 
referred to as CST) as accrued by the states. This is chiefly because CST relates to certain 
goods that are deemed to be of special importance in inter – state trade or commerce and the 
entire revenue accruing under the levy of CST is collected and kept by the state in which the 
sale originates. CST being an origin based tax, is thus inconsistent with the destination based 
VAT and as per the Whitepaper by the Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers 
(2005), a decision has been taken for duly phasing out of inter – state sales tax or CST. 
Accordingly an amendment to the Central Sales Tax Act was effected in to provide for 
reduction of the rate of CST from 4% to 3% with effect from 1st April, 2007. CST rate has 
been further reduced from 3% to 2% with effect from 1st June, 2008.  
As our second robustness check we redo our initial exercise dropping the states of Bihar, 
Jharkhand and Uttarakhand, as the data on sales tax available for these states, are either mostly 
revised estimates (e.g., for Bihar) or are available only for a few periods (e.g., for Jharkhand 
and Uttarakhand). The results from these two exercises are summarized in Tables 4 and 5.  
 
 
10 We have also conducted tests that indicate that the residues from our estimation are stationery but these results 
are not reported in the tables but are freely available with the authors. 
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 Table 4 
Estimation results (Total sales tax collected by the states excluding CST) 
States 
Coefficient of GSDP under 
Sales Tax regime 
(I) 
Coefficient of GSDP 
under VAT regime 
(II) 𝚫𝚫𝜶𝜶𝒊𝒊(in Rs lakhs) 
Coefficient 
(I)=(II) 
(p-values) 
Coefficient 
(I)<=(II) 
(p-values) 
General Category States 
Andhra Pradesh 0.1074*** 0.1085*** -153094.0938 0.9275 0.5362 
 (0.0099) (0.0086) (181759.0938)   
Bihar -0.0189** 0.0476*** -370450.0000*** 0.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0085) (0.0054) (50593.8203)   
Delhi 0.1278*** 0.1804*** -227065.7031 0.0907 0.9546 
 (0.0253) (0.0368) (162844.7969)   
Goa 0.0502*** 0.0514*** 282.0608 0.8997 0.5502 
 (0.0076) (0.0079) (10927.4805)   
Gujarat 0.0362*** 0.0529*** -148417.7031 0.3550 0.8225 
 (0.0095) (0.0094) (310955.1875)   
Haryana 0.0733*** 0.0562*** 157934.2031* 0.3035 0.1518 
 (0.0133) (0.0049) (95182.1016)   
Jharkhand -0.1148 0.0910*** -829887.8750*** 0.0125 0.9937 
 (0.0909) (0.0155) (301803.9063)   
Karnataka 0.0291 0.1523** -1446573.0000 0.2107 0.8947 
 (0.0529) (0.0701) (1206642.0000)   
Kerala 0.0881*** 0.2027*** -1011916.0000*** 0.0002 0.9999 
 (0.0148) (0.0214) (250187.0938)   
Madhya Pradesh 0.0718*** 0.0663*** 53364.9805 0.7206 0.3603 
 (0.0082) (0.0090) (128979.8984)   
Maharashtra 0.0920*** 0.0980*** -431893.1875 0.8034 0.5983 
 (0.0160) (0.0099) (584447.8750)   
Orissa 0.1085 0.0409** 304146.9063 0.4221 0.2111 
 (0.0692) (0.0196) (389981.1875)   
Punjab 0.0828*** 0.1037*** -120812.3984 0.5345 0.7327 
 (0.0161) (0.0255) (242514.2969)   
Rajasthan 0.0712*** 0.0371*** 379110.0938*** 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0061) (0.0084) (97125.8672)   
Tamil Nadu 0.1014*** 0.1019*** -134199.0000 0.9728 0.5136 
 (0.0074) (0.0145) (278266.3125)   
Uttar Pradesh 0.0944*** 0.1017*** -127071.2031 0.7925 0.6038 
 (0.0051) (0.0279) (626179.0000)   
Uttarakhand -0.0225 0.0832*** -191071.7031** 0.0208 0.9896 
 (0.0380) (0.0118) (79385.9688)   
West Bengal 0.0331*** 0.0807*** -625890.8125*** 0.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0041) (0.0038) (75388.7031)   
Special Category States 
Arunachal Pradesh -0.2567 0.0519 -74286.0078 0.7989 0.6006 
 (1.1726) (0.0639) (302367.0000)   
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Assam 0.1870*** 0.0405* 552648.1250*** 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0279) (0.0213) (111820.8984)   
Himachal Pradesh 0.0356*** 0.0766*** -68793.8203*** 0.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0029) (0.0088) (18465.4902)   
Jammu and Kashmir 0.0988*** 0.2487*** -246340.2031*** 0.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0118) (0.0233) (53784.6211)   
Manipur 0.0201*** 0.0855*** -21520.3008*** 0.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0023) (0.0044) (1934.6890)   
Meghalaya 0.0393*** 0.0461*** 959.3274 0.4349 0.7825 
 (0.0072) (0.0023) (2999.7661)   
Mizoram 0.1067*** 0.0496*** 8416.0068*** 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0059) (0.0031) (693.9545)   
Nagaland 0.0151*** 0.0541*** -12670.8701*** 0.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0020) (0.0060) (2596.5310)   
Sikkim 0.0878*** 0.0045* 8943.9971*** 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0172) (0.0024) (1033.3430)   
Tripura 0.0474*** 0.0627*** -8192.0645 0.3196 0.8402 
 (0.0039) (0.0133) (10371.8203)   
Hansen J statistic 
(overidentification test of 
all instruments):                  
Chi-square(28)  P-value: 
           
IV Reset Test  
(Ho: E(y|X) linear in X): 
Chi-square(3)  P-value:   
         
 
 
27.5430 
0.4889 
 
 
2.5100 
0.4731 
R2: 0.9695 (uncentered) 
0.9695 (centered) 
    
 
Number of observations:  
 
511 
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Table 5 
Estimation results (Bihar, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand dropped) 
States 
Coefficient of GSDP under 
Sales Tax regime 
(I) 
Coefficient of GSDP 
under VAT regime 
(II) 𝚫𝚫𝜶𝜶𝒊𝒊(in Rs lakhs) 
Coefficient 
(I)=(II) 
(p-values) 
Coefficient 
(I)<=(II) 
(p-values) 
General Category States 
Andhra Pradesh 0.1115*** 0.1098*** -108906.2031 0.9018 0.4509 
 (0.0093) (0.0106) (216469.2969)   
Delhi 0.1873*** 0.1662*** 76664.8594 0.5436 0.2718 
 (0.0203) (0.0402) (198630.4063)   
Goa 0.0564*** 0.0540*** 1531.4690 0.8213 0.4107 
 (0.0076) (0.0095) (13525.2803)   
Gujarat 0.0467*** 0.0683*** -297150.0000 0.2255 0.8872 
 (0.0085) (0.0099) (312307.9063)   
Haryana 0.0946*** 0.0519*** 312101.0000** 0.0646 0.0323 
 (0.0164) (0.0084) (142070.7031)   
Karnataka 0.0396 0.1401* -1168830.0000 0.3550 0.8225 
 (0.0551) (0.0781) (1348391.0000)   
Kerala 0.0925*** 0.1941*** -902726.6250*** 0.0048 0.9976 
 (0.0133) (0.0285) (311303.5938)   
Madhya Pradesh 0.0693*** 0.0679*** 18914.2891 0.9191 0.4596 
 (0.0057) (0.0101) (115990.3984)   
Maharashtra 0.0992*** 0.1022*** -423209.8125 0.9050 0.5475 
 (0.0163) (0.0111) (624556.1875)   
Orissa 0.1405** 0.0327 533724.6875 0.2162 0.1081 
 (0.0705) (0.0217) (408398.5938)   
Punjab 0.0880*** 0.0991*** -73785.4375 0.7457 0.6271 
 (0.0165) (0.0267) (250094.0938)   
Rajasthan 0.0758*** 0.0408*** 387106.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0064) (0.0081) (92620.0469)   
Tamil Nadu 0.1142*** 0.1055*** -67616.6172 0.5923 0.2961 
 (0.0079) (0.0157) (296613.1875)   
Uttar Pradesh 0.1023*** 0.1156*** -252903.5000 0.6099 0.6950 
 (0.0045) (0.0270) (592038.8125)   
West Bengal 0.0330*** 0.0801*** -601091.6250*** 0.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0068) (0.0048) (98639.5469)   
Special Category States 
Arunachal Pradesh -0.2570 0.0519 -74370.6172 0.8300 0.5850 
 (1.3932) (0.0754) (359312.1875)   
Assam 0.1813*** 0.0770*** 394348.1875*** 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0196) (0.0161) (81596.5391)   
Himachal Pradesh 0.0374*** 0.0932*** -96207.1875*** 0.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0027) (0.0099) (21337.3906)   
Jammu and Kashmir 0.0988*** 0.2490*** -246971.7969*** 0.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0118) (0.0233) (53774.3711)   
Manipur 0.0200*** 0.0855*** -21538.1191*** 0.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0023) (0.0043) (1918.3879)   
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Meghalaya 0.0405*** 0.0553*** -4110.4570*** 0.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0027) (0.0020) (1401.5680)   
Mizoram 0.1066*** 0.0496*** 8407.8594*** 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0061) (0.0030) (732.1178)   
Nagaland 0.0151*** 0.0542*** -12692.6904*** 0.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0020) (0.0059) (2581.0740)   
Sikkim 0.1021*** 0.0044* 10202.4902*** 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0159) (0.0024) (942.9239)   
Tripura 0.0472*** 0.0626*** -8234.2783 0.2942 0.8529 
 (0.0040) (0.0126) (9943.9697)   
Hansen J statistic 
(overidentification test of 
all instruments):                  
Chi-square(25)  P-value: 
           
IV Reset Test  
(Ho: E(y|X) linear in X): 
Chi-square(3)  P-value:   
         
 
 
26.3880 
0.3871 
 
 
2.7600 
0.4302 
R2: 0.9713 (uncentered)   
0.9713 (centered)    
    
 
Number of observations:  
 
469 
    
 
 
 
These results depict that our earlier conclusion regarding the effectiveness of VAT holds true 
for most of the states. But in comparison to our earlier results, we find that the situation has 
worsened for some of the states if we consider total sales tax revenues on commodities net of 
CST as our dependent variable. The improvement in tax collection measured as a decrease in 
the effective rate of taxation as well as an increase in the overall tax base as observed earlier, 
has either been dampened (e.g., for the state of Haryana) or totally reversed (for the state of 
Uttarakhand). For Delhi, we notice an increase in the effective rate of taxation post introduction 
of VAT. These results further our earlier claim about the overall ineffectiveness and indeed a 
regressive impact of VAT. 
VI. Conclusion 
In the Indian context, indirect taxes have a significant role in the fiscal structures of the states 
and during the last decade, the structure of the commodity taxes was amended to make way for 
state – level VAT. The primary objective of this move was to rationalize the system’s complex 
tax on tax cascades from production to final consumption thus resulting in a simple, transparent 
and more efficient system of taxation.  
Our analysis measures some of the quantitative aspects of the introduction of VAT. We find 
that overall, the introduction of VAT has had a regressive impact on the tax base as well as a 
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hike in the effective rate of taxation. Our findings thus refute some of the claims that were 
forwarded in favor of VAT. Although our findings are rather pessimistic, there always remains 
the possibility that in the course of time, VAT will indeed catch up and even supersede sales 
tax in terms of a larger tax base with a lower effective rate of taxation. 
Apart from the tax base and effective rate of taxation, there is also a need to concern ourselves 
with the impact of this change in the tax collection mechanism on other aspects of the economy 
which relate to growth and development (for example the impact on resource distribution and 
thus productivity, changes in consumption patterns etc.) – which also demands further 
empirical investigations. There is a large theoretical literature which deals with such matters. 
Emran and Stiglitz (2005) for example, show that in the presence of a substantial informal 
sector, a tax like VAT which falls more on the formal sector acts to deter the growth and 
development of the country as a whole. Keen (2007) also raises similar concern about the poor 
functionality of this new system of indirect tax collection in the presence of a large informal 
sector, especially in developing economies. India has a prominent and large informal sector. 
So, it becomes very relevant to further evaluate the prospects of VAT to discern any of its 
shortcomings, especially as India considers the introduction of a uniform, comprehensive 
Goods and Services Tax extending through the retail stage. 
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